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Case No. 20160173-SC
INTHE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,
V.

THOMAS RANDALL AINSWORTH,
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

Reply Brief of Petitioner
and Brief of Cross-Respondent
Pursuant to rule 24(g)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
State submits this reply to new matters raised in the respondent's brief,
Resp. Brf. 12-36 (points I & II), which includes two alternative arguments for
affirming the court of appeals' holding finding the DWI second-degreefelony enhancement provision unconstitutional. See Order granting Petition
for Writ of Certiorari and Cross-Petition in Part; dated July 20, 2016.
And pursuant to rule 24(g)(3), the State also responds, as crossrespondent, to Ainsworth' s argument that the district court abused its discretion by ordering that his prison terms be served consecutively, Resp. Brf.
37-14 (point III)- the sole issue on which this Court granted Ainsworth' s

cross petition for writ of certiorari. See Order granting Petition for Writ of
Certiorari and Cross-Petition in Part, dated July 20, 2016.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
Introduction

Under Part 5 of the Traffic Code, which addresses criminal offenses
for "Driving Under the Influence and Reckless Driving," it is a class B misdemeanor to both (1) drive a vehicle while impaired by drugs-controlled
·or uncontrolled, legal or illegal-(DUI), Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b)
(West 2013); and (2) drive a vehicle while having "any measurable controlled substance" in the body without a valid prescription (" driying with
illegal drugs" or "DWI" for short), Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2) (West
2013). Thus, a driver illegally using drugs is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
under the DWI statute even absent a factual showing of impairment.
'

'

The Legislature's approach to DWis is not unlike its approach to
DUis based on a blood or breath alcohol content (BAC) of .08 grams or
greater-impairment is presumed by statute. See Murray City v. Hall, 663
P.2d 1314, 1318-19 (Utah 1983) (holding that section 41-6-44.2's prohibition
of driving with "a BAC of .10 percent or greater gives rise to a conclusive pre-

sumption of being under the influence," which was a required showing for DUI
under section 41-6-44) (emphasis added). The only difference between the
DUI statute's .08 BAC_ provision_and the DWI statute is the level of the sub-
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I~

stance tolerated- .08 grams in the case of alcohol and "any measurable"
r.
I~

amount in the case of an illegal controlled substance.
DUI and DWI offenders are both subject to enhanced penalties when
they cause death or serious bodily injury due to negligent driving. A DUI
offense is elevated to a third degree felony under the automobile homicide
statute if the negligent driving "caus[es] the death of another." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(a) (West 2009). A DUI offense is also elevated to a third
degree felony under part 5 of the Traffic Code if the negligent driving "inflict[ s] serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-503(2)(a) (West 2013).
The DWI enhancements for negligently causing death or serious bodily injury are found in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, which enhances the
penalties depending on the type of controlled substance that is illegally
used. A DWI for illegal use of a schedule III, IV, or V controlled substance is
a class A misdemeanor; a DWI for illegal use of marijuana is a third degree
felony; and a DWI for illegal_ ~se of a schedule I or II controlled substance
(other than marijuana) is a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(h) (West Supp. 2016).
The court of appeals struck the second-degree-felony designation for
schedule I and II DWis, concluding that its imposition of a penalty that is
harsher than automobile homicide, which requires a factual _showing of
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drug impairment, ·violates the uniform-operation-of-laws provision of the
Utah Constitution. As explained in the State's opening .brief, the court of
appeals failed to give "[b]road deference" to the Legislature's assessment of
"'the reasonablenes·s of its classifications and their relationship to legitimate
legislative purposes,'" as it is required to do. State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30,
~23, 254 P.3d 183 (citations omitted). Instead, it has improperly substituted
· its judgment for that of the Legislature as to what conduct is more deserving of harsher punishment.

I.
The DWI enhancement statute does not violate the federal or state constitutions.
In his responsive brief, Ainsworth makes four arguments in support
of the court of appeals' opinion_~at merit response: (A) that the Legislature
"_acted unreasonably" when it, adopted the DWI second-degree-felony. enhancement provision because it imposes harsher punishment on persons
.

.

"whose conduct is less culp~ble, less dangerous, and less reprehensible"
than those guilty of automobile homicide or DUI-with-serious-injury,
. Resp.Br£. 16,22-25 (pt I.A); (B) that the second-degree-felony-enhancement
provision "creates an unconstitutional incentive for 'arbitrary and standardless' prosecutio!l," Resp.Br£. 18-21 (pf I.A); (C)_ that the second-degreefelony-enhancement provision violates federal and state due process protec-
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tions "because it does not rationally further a legitimate governmental interest," Resp.Br£. 25-28 (pt. LB); and (D)_ that the D\,yl statute's prescription
exemption violates the uniform-operation-of-laws provision of the Utah
Constitution, Resp.Br£. 28-37 (pt II).

A. The Legislature reasonably concluded that persons who negligently drive and cause death or serious injury while illegally using schedule I or II controlled substances deserve harsher punishment than those guilty of automobile homicide or
DUI with serious injury.
Much of Ainsworth's argument rests on the premise that the seconddegree-felony DWI enhancement imposes harsher penalties for conduct that
i.s "less culpable, less dangerous, and less reprehensible." Resp.Br£. 16,22-23.
This claim fails because the DWI second-degree-felony offense is not a less
culpable, less dangerous, or less reprehensible offense.
Ainsworth compares the DWI second-degree-felony enhancement to
statutes in other jurisdictions that have been found to violate equal protection. See Resp.Br£. 23-25. But those cases bear no resemblance to the statute
at issue here. All but one case cited by Ainsworth addressed statutes that
imposed a harsher penalty for crimes requiring, as an element of the offense, a less severe result, or an intent to cause a less severe .result. See
.
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Resp.Br£. 23-25. 1 In contrast, the statutes at issue here all require, as elements of the offense, serious bodily injury or death of another as the result
of negligent driving. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(g)(ii) (West Supp.
2016) (" operates a motor vehicle ... in a negligent manner, causing serious
bodily injury ... or the death of another"); Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-503(2)(a)
(West 2013) (has "inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner"); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(a) (West 2009) ("operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another"). In other words, the mental
.

'

state and the resulting injury under all three statutes is the same.

1

See Smith v. People, 852 P.2d 420, 421-22 (Colo. 1993) (en bane) (im-

posing harsher penalty for intending to cause bodily injury but causing serious bodily injury than for int~nding to cause serious bodily injury and
.·causing serious bodily injury); People v. Montoya, 582 P.2d 673, 675 (Colo.
1978) (en bane) (imposing harsher penalty for intentionally causing serious
bodily injury under heat-of passion than for intentionally causing death of
another under heat of passion); People v. Suazo, 867 P.2d 161, 164-66 (Colo.
App. 1993) (imposing harsher penalty for knowingly or recklessly causing
bodily injury on elderly than for intentionally causing serious bodily injury
on elderly); State v. O'Neill, 511 A.2d 321, 330-32 (Conn. 1986) (imposing
harsher penalty for arson than for arson resulting in death); Iacovone v. State,
639 So.2d 1108, 1109-10 (Fla. App. 1994) (imposing harsher penalty for attempted murder of police officer than for murder of police officer); State v.
Asfoor, 249 N.W.2d 529, 541-42 (Wis. 1977) (hnposing harsher penalty for
causing injury by negligent use of weapon than for causing _death by negligent use of weapon).
·
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The other case cited by Ainsworth involved legislation that "cre~ted
an irreconcilable conflict in [two] statutes." State v. Jenkins, 504 A.2d 1053,
.

.

1058 (Conn. 1986). No such conflict exists among the statutes at issue here.

· Jenkins· addressed two Connecticut kidnapping laws. The first law
1nade kidnapping a class A felony and, as a result, was punishable by a
mandatory minimum prison term of 10 years. Id. at 1055-56. The second
law-kidnapping with a firearm-was part of a "statutory package" adopted-.:by the Connecticut legislature "to strengthen penalties for the commission of designated crimes when the commission of those crimes involved
the use of firearms." Id. at 1056. To achieve this objective, the legislature imposed "a one year mandatory 1ninimum sentence" for the designated crimes
in the "statutory package." Id. This statutory scheme achieved the legisla~ure' s objective of harsher pe1:a1ties for all of the crimes in the statutory
package, except the lone class A felony-kidnapping with a firearm. Id. It in
fact redu~ed the 10 year mandatory minimum sentence for the class A felony offense to a one year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. Based on the legislative history, the Connecti~ut supreme court concluded that this was an
oversight by the legislature, "m.istakenly deeming [kidnapping] among the
'lesser crimes' requiring stiffer pen~lties." Id.
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The Utah Legislature did not rnake a similar mistake with Utah's DWI
enhancements. And they were consistent with the Legislature's objective to
enhance the penalties for illegally using drugs, getting behind the wheel,
and causing death or serious injury. As explained in the State's opening
brief, Pet.Br£. 23-25, the DWI enhancement provision was part of the 2003
"Automobile Homicide Amendn1ents" of Senate Bill 7. 2003 Utah Laws c.10,
§ 1, at 203-05. The legislation did two things: (1) it subjected defendants
convicted of illegal use of controlled substances to an enhanced penalty if
r::,

they were negligently driving and caused death or serious injury; and (2) it
created a rebuttable presumption of impairment for illegal drug use.
Und~r the 2003 legislation, illegal drug users wer~ made subject "to·
one degree great~r penalty" if they were "operat[ing] a motor vehicle in a
neglig~nt maimer and cause[d] death or serious bodily injury," 2003 Utah
Laws c.10, § 1, at 203 (preface to bill). Thus, where illegal use of marijuana
or a schedule III, IV, or V controlled substance was, without more, a class B
misdemeanor, the statute increased the crime to a class A misdemeanor if
~e illegal user was negligently driving and caused death or serious injury.
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-8(2)(d)

~

(g) (Supp. 200~)- And where illegal use of

_:,

a schedule I or II controlled. substance was, without 1nore, a third degree
felony, the statute increased the crime to a second degree felony if the illegal
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~

user was-negligently driving and caused death or serious injury. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b) & (g) (Supp. 2003). Thus, the DWI enhancement statute
is, at its core, an enhancement provision for illegal drug use.
Three years later, the Legislature revised the enhancement provisions,
increasing the penalty for negligent drivers illegally using n1arijuana and
spelling out the penalties for drivers illegally using other drugs. See 2006
Utah Laws c.30, § 1. Under the 2006 amendments (which have not been
amended substantively since), negligent drivers illegally using marijuana
are "guilty of a third degree felony," rather than a class A misdemeanor as
before. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(h)(ii) (West Supp. 2006). Negligent
. drivers illegally using schedule I or II controlled substances (other than marijuana) remain." guilty of a second degree felony," Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(h)(i), and negligent drivers illegally using schedule III, ~V, or V controlled substances remain "guilty of a. class A misdemeanor," Utah Code
Ann.§ 58-37-8(2)(h)(iii).
But-the legislation also addressed a second concern-the difficulty in
proving how and when drug use impairs driving. See Pet.Br£. 25-26. As the
2003 floor debates make clear, the legislation addressed this problem by
adopting a "zero tolerance" policy for drugs used illegally, 2003 Sen. Fl. Debate SB0007, Day 8 (1/27/2003), at 59:40-45 (Walker, C.)-i..e., an irrebutta-
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ble presumption of impairment. See id. at 58:14-40 (Walker, C.) (explaining
that legislation responds to "difficulties in linking a particular level of impairment to a drug"); 2003 House Fl. Debate SB0007S1, Day 38 (2/26/2003),
at 2:41:25-39 (Christensen, L.) (explaining that legislation addresses "difficulty in the context of the automobile homicide statute" which provides "no
assurance that there could be a causal connection for an impairment or influence that ultimately contributed to the accident"); see also 2006 Sen. Fl.
Debate SB00Sl, Day 10 (1/25/2006), at 1:04:02-10 (Walker, C.) (explaining
that legislation addresses "problem" that one "cannot measure every drug
at the level at which you are impaired").
The DWI legislation is thus no different than Utah's DUI law, which
criminalizes not only driving while "under the influence of alcohol ... to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle," but
also driving "with a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater" at either "the time of the test" or" at the time of operation or actual
physical control" of the vehicle. Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-502(1) (West 2013).
Thus, a person is guilty of DUI if he or she has a .08 BAC or greater, regardless of actual impairment. Likewise, a person is guilty of DWI if he or she
has any measurable controlled _substance in the body, regardless of actual
impairme~t. In both cases, impairrnent is statutorily presumed~ Cf Hall, 663
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P.2d at 1318-19 (holding that .10 BAC provision "gives rise to a conclusive
presumption of being under the influence").
A DWI enhancement offense does not, therefore, involve conduct that

is "less culpable, less dangerous, and less reprehensible" than tl)e conduct
involved in an automobile homicide or DUI with serious injury. All three
require, as elements of the offense, serious bodily injury or death of another
as the result of negligent driving. And all three have as their "common purpose ... eliminating from our public highways the dangers posed by intoxicated drivers." Murray City, 663 P.2d at 1318 (addressing DUI statute and
.10 BAC statute). While automobile homicide and DUI-with-serious-injury
require a factual showing of alcohol or drug impairment, the DWI enhancen1ent presumes impairment by creating a "zero-tolerance" policy
when drugs are illegally used.
Where illegal users of schedule I and II controlled substances are not
under the sh·ict controls relating to the manufacture, need, and use of the
drug, the Legislature may reasonably conclude that the risk of abuse is
greater and deserving of harsher punishment than those who submit to
those controls by obtaining a prescription from a physician._ Indeed, the legitin1ate penological justification for punishment is not lin1ited to retribution, but includes deterrence. State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, if 263, 353 P.3d 55
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(Durham,

J.,

dissenting). In this case, the Legislature could also
reasonably
.
.

determine that the uncontrolled, and thus highly dangerous, use of schedule I and II controlled substanc~s merited harsher penalties to deter such
conduct.
B.

The DWI statute does not create an unconstitutional incentive
for arbitrary and standardless prosecution.

Ainsworth complains that if the DWI enhancement statute is read to
include impairing and non-impairing amounts of a controlled substance, a
prosecutor could charge a negligent driver illegally using drugs under either statute, which would thereby encourage arbitrary and standardless
prosecution. Resp.Br£. 19-20. This claim fails.
This Court has explained that three circumstances exist where a defendant's conduct may fall within two statutes:
"(1) where one statute defines a lesser included offense of the
other and they carry different penalties (e.g., whoever carries a
concealed weapon is guilty of a misdemeanor; a convicted felon
who carries a concealed weapon is guilty of a felony); (2) where
the statutes overlap and carry different penalties (e.g., possession of a· g(ln by a convicted felon, illegal alien or dishonorably
discharged serviceman is a misdemeanor; possession of a gun
by a convicted felon, fugitive from justice, or unlawful user of
narcotics is ·a felony); [and] (3) where the statutes are identical
(e.g., possession of a gun
a convicted felon is a misdemeanor; possessi~n of a gun by_a convicted felon is a felony)."

by

State v. Williams, 2007 UT 98, ,I21, 175 P.3d 1029 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave,

Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure§ 13.7(a) (2d ed. 2007)).
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Where th~ DWI enhance1nent. statute creates a legislative presumption of impairment, the DWI, automobile homicide, and DUI-with-seriousinjury statutes reasonably fall within the first category- one statute shares
all the elements of another but adds an aggravating factor, e.g., "'robberyarmed robbery;. battery-aggravated battery; joyriding-theft; housebreakingburglary.'" Id. (quoting LaFave, at § 13.7(a)). In this case, the DWI enhancement statute shares the elements of negligent driving, causing death
or serious injury, and impairment (legislatively presumed for "any measurable" amount), but requires the aggravating circumstance of unlawful drug
use.
Like other enhancement statutes,· the DWI statute is "' a consequence
of a deliberate attempt by the legislature to identify one or more aggravating characteristics which in the judgment of the legislature should ordinarily be viewed as making the lesser crime more serious."' Id. (quoting LaFave, at§ 13.7(a)). This Court in Williams agreed that such enhancement statutes are" 'unobjectionable'" because they" 'afford guidance to the prosecutor'" in exercising his or her prosecutorial discretion. Id. (quoting LaFave, at
§ 13.7(a)). And prosecutors may still properly decide" 'in a particular case
that, notwithstanding the presence of one of the aggravating facts, the de-
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fendant will still be prosecuted for the lesser offense.' Id. (quoting Lafave,
11

.

.

at§ 13.7(a)).
Even if the statutes at issue here were not construed as falling within
the first category, at worst, they fall within the second category, sharing
overlapping, but not identical, elements. As explained in Williams,
'"[d]rafting a clear criminal statute and still ensuring that in no instance
could it cover conduct embraced within any existing criminal statute in that
jurisdiction can be a formidable task.'

11

Id. (quoting LaFave, at § 13.7(a)).

Such statutes do not offend equal protection principles because they "' at
.

.

least sometimes assist the prosecutor in deciding how to exercise his charging
discretion."' Id. (quoting LaFave, at § 13.7(a)); id._ (choosing to following
analysis of Batchelder v. United States, 442 U.S. 114 (1979), with respect to first
and second categories).
Certainly, the DWI, automobile homicide, and DUI-with-seriousinjury statutes do not fall with4'1 the third category which involve identical
el~ments. Automobile homicide and DUI-with-serious-injury do not require
a showing _of illegal drug use. Accordingly, the DWI enhancement provision
does no~ suffer from the same malady as the juvenile direct-file statute at
issue in State v. Mahi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995)-the case upon_which Ainswor~ relies. See Resp.Br£. 18-20. The direct-file statute at issue in Mahi per-
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~tted prosecutors to try juveniles for identical offenses in either juvenile
court or_ criminally as adults in district court, but there was "absolutely
nothing in the statute to identity the juveniles to be tried as adults; [the statute described] no distinctive characteristics to set them apart from juveniles
... who remain in juvenile jurisdiction." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 998. This Court
held that such "undirected discretion to choose where to file charges against
certain juvenile offenders [was] unconstitutional" under the uniformoperation-of-laws provision. Id. at 1004.
Unlike the direct-file s_tatute, the DWI enhancement provision does
not give prosecutors unfettered discretion in choosing when to pursue a
DWI enhancement prosecution-they may do so .only when the defendant
has illegally used controlled substances. The DWI enhancement statute,
therefore, does not unconstitutionally encourage arbitrary and standardless
prosecution as claimed by Ainsworth. Like other enhancement statutes, it
permits prosecution for the greater offense only where the aggravator, i.e.,
unlawful drug use, is present.
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C. The DWI enhancement provision does not violate federal and
state due process protections because it is rationally related to
a legitimate government interest..:.preventing individuals
from driving while illegally using controlled substances.

Ainsworth also argues that this Court may affirm on the alternative
ground that the DWI enhancement provision violates federal and state due
process protections. Resp.Br£. 25-28. This claim also lacks merit.
" 'When undertaking a substantive due process analysis under both
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, this court applies a rational basis test unless the government action implicates a fundamental right or interest.'"

St-ate v. Angilau, ·2011 UT 3, 110, 245 P.3d 745 (quoting State v. Candedo, 2010
,c,

UT 32, if 16, 232 P.3d 1008). Where, as here, "there is no fundamental right at
issue, 'a statute will not violate substantive due process if it is rationally related to a legitimate state intere_st.'" Id. (quoting Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ,I19).
The Court does n~t determine whether the Legislature made a wise policy
decision; it only determines whether it"' overstepped the bounds of its constitutional authority.'" Id. (quo~g Candedo, 2010 _UT 32, if19). The Legislature here did not.
As explained, substituting "any measurable amount" of an illegal
controlle~ substance for demonstrable impairment was a reasonable approach to the limitations of demo~strating impairment related to drug u~e.
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See Pet.Br£. 25-~6. And as expJained, the Legislature has a legitimate interest
· in preventing (and punishing) those who choose to drive while illegally us-

ing controlled ~mbstances. The increased risk of harm to other motorists
posed by those who choose to drive while using controlled substances absent the strict controls imposed by law merits the harsher punishment. In
short, for the same reason that the DWI enhancement provision does not violate the uniform-operation-of-laws provision, it does not violate the federal
and state due process provisions.
D. The DWI enhancement statute's prescription exemption does
not violate the uniform-operation-of-laws provision of the
Utah Constitution.

Ainsworth also argues that this Court may affirm the court of appeals
opinion on the "' alternative ground[ ]'" that the DWI statute's prescription
exemption violates the Utah Constitution's uniform-operation-of-laws provision. Resp.Br£. 28-37 (point II of Ainsworth's brief). According to Ainsworth, the statute's prescription exemption "treats similarly situated people
differently without a reasonable objective." Resp.Br£. 29. The court of appeals agreed that by imposing enhanced penalties on negligent drivers ille-·
gally using drugs but not on negligent drivers lawfully using drugs, the
statute treats similarly situated people differently. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App
2, ,r11, 365 P.3d 1227. The court held, however, that the disparate treatment
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"does not violate the uniform operation of laws provision, because the legislature had a reasonable basis for making the classification." Id. at ,r12. This
Court should affirm.
In determining whether a statutory scheme offends the uniformoperation-of-laws provision, the Court must first ask whether the statutes
create a classification that treats similarly situated persons differently. See

State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, if34, 233 P.3d 476. If not, the inquiry ends: the
Court "need not analyze whether the laws are applied equally ... or whether [there is] different treatment. Article I, section 24 is not violated." State v.
.

.

Honie, 2002 UT 4,

,r 35, 57 P.3d 977. But if so,

the Court must "analyze the

scheme to determine if 'the legislature had any reasonable objective that
warrants the disparity.'" Drej, 2010 UT 35,

,r

34 (quoting State v. Schofield,

2002 UT 132, ,r 12, 63 P.3d 667).
The State concedes that the DWI statute creates a classification between legal and illegal drug users. But contrary to the court of appeals opinion, that classification
does not involve
"similarly situated persons." Id. at
.
.

ii

34. _And if it did, the Legislature had a reasonable objective that warranted
the disparity.

-18-

1. Limiting the DWI enhancement statute's reach to illegal
drug users does not create a classification that involves
similarly situated persons.

The threshold inquiry under the uniform-operation-of-law analysis is
two-fold: (1) "what, if any, classification is created under the statute," and if
there is a classification, (2) does it "impose[ ] on similarly situated persons
disparate treatment." Drej, 2010 UT 35, if 34. Although the DWI prescription
exemption creates a classification separating negligent drivers illegally using drugs from negligent drivers lawfully using drugs, that classification
does not involve similarly situated persons.
The State does not dispute that the DWI statute creates a classification
and that the classification imposes disparate treatment. Negligent drivers
illegally using drugs are subject to the enhanced penalties of the statute;
negligent drivers using drugs under a valid prescription are not. See Utah
Code Ann._§ 41-6a-517(3) (West 2013) ("It is ~n affirmative defens_e_to prosecution under this section that the controlled substance was ... prescribed by
a practitioner for use by the accused .... "). 2 However, drivers illegally using
dr1:1gs and drivers legally using drugs are not similarly situated.

2

Negligent drivers usirig drugs under prescription who negligently
c~use death or serious injury can only be prosecuted under the DUI enhancement· statutes, which require a factual showing of drug impairment.
See_ Utah Code Am1. § 41-6a-503(2) (West 2013) (DUI causing serious injury);
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-207(2) (West 2009) (automobile homicide).
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The State admits that some similarities exist between the two classes
of persons: both negligently drive causing death or serious injury and both
are using controlled substances while driving. But "[m]ere commonality between two statutes is not always sufficient to establish that a legislative classification treats similarly situated persons disparately." Drej, 2010 UT 35,
,r38. Despite the presence of common factors, persons are not similarly situ-

ated if there are "significant differences."

Id. Such is the case here, as

demonstrated by the testimony of Ainsworth's own expert, Dr. Glen Roy
Hansen, a professor at the University of Utah in the Department of Phannacology and Toxicology. R453: 5.
At the outset, it is important to understand the nature of schedule I
and II controlled substances, the drugs at issue in the provision challenged
here. Schedule I substances, like heroin, have "a very high abuse potential"
and have little clinical value. R453:15. Accordingly, "there are no approved
clinical uses" for these drugs in ~e United States. R453:15.
Schedule II substances, like methamphetamine, can have significant
clinical value, and "controlled" use is thus permitted to achieve "therapeutic objectives ... without serious substance abuse problems. R453:17,19; ac-

cord Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(?)(b) (West Supp. 2011). For example, methamphetamine is u~ed medicinal!y "in the treatment of narcolepsy, attention
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deficit disorder (ADD), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD)." Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets: Methamphetamine (and

Amphetamine), at 1, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, loc. at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/job185drugs/methamphe
tamine.htm (last visited January 5, 2017) (hereinafter "Fact Sheets") (Pet.Br£.,
Add C). It is also used "in the treatment of obesity, overeating disorders,
and weight loss" - but "infrequently" due to its abuse potential. Id.
Schedule II controlled substances like methamphetamine "have as
much or more abuse potential" than schedule I controlled substances.
R453:17; accord Fact Sheets, 3 e'Methamphetamine has a high potential for
abuse and dependence."). Methamphetamine "activates several neuronal
systems or neurobiological systems," and may thus cause different pharmacological effects. R453:39. For ~xample, it affects the en~ocrine system (causing pleasure), the hormonal system, the cardiovascular system (stimulating
the heart rate and increasing blood pressure), the cognitive system (decision-making and information processing), and the limbic system (affecting
emo~ions). R453:39. At therapeutic levels for treatment of obesity and
APHD, methamphetamine does not greatly affect cognitive skills, but at
higher levels, users "tend to be less rational, ... more impulsive, and ... even
... psychotic." R453:40. And recreational use of met~amphetamine, or meth-
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amphetamine abuse, can impair· a person's ability to safely drive. R453:63.
While· therapeutic· levels of methamphetamine are relatively safe, higher
levels can have long term and even perm.anent consequences-it can "permanently damage [one's] brain circuitry," cause hemorrhaging of blood
vessels, or cause long term adverse effects on an unborn baby. R453:45-46.
Moreover, those who use schedule II controlled substances can become tolerant of the drug- requiring increased dosages to achieve the desired effect-whether recreational or medicinal. R453:20-21. But only physicians are qualified to determin~ the appropriate increase to achieve a safe
therapeutic effect. R453:34.
a. Lawful users of schedule II controlled substances receive the drugs under a physician's direction and are
subject to strict controls and monitoring to prevent
abuse.

Given the high risk of abuse of schedule II drugs, their manufacture,
prescription, and use is strictly controlled and monitored. See R453:13-14,17Before a schedule II drug-like the n1ethamphetamine drug Desoxyn-is
made available for use in the United States, it must undergo clinical trials to
show its· effectiveness in achieving the desired pharmacological result and
to establish its therapeutic range-" the dose necessary to achieve a therapeutic objective" without causing severe side effects. R453:23. And to prevent users from accumulating schedule II controlled substances, restrictions
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exist on when and how often a patient can obtain a prescription refill.
R453:25,33.
Great efforts are also expended to ensure that patients are wellinformed about schedule II controlled substances and that patients use the
drugs safely. For example, in addition to dosage limits set by the prescribing
physician, pharmacists have an obligation to consult with patients on proper use/side effects, and drug interactions. R453:32,35. Pharmacists are also
required to enter dispensing information in a database maintained by the
Utah Department of Professional and Occupational Licensing (DOPL).
R453:30-31. Pharmacists and physicians statewide can access a patient's
drug history on the DOPL database to guard against abuse, such as a patient obtaining a schedule II controlled substance from multiple sources.
R453:31.
b. Illegal users of schedule II controlled substances procure the drugs through unlawful channels and thus
bypass all the safeguards in place to avoid abusive
and dangerous use.

In contrast, those who illegally use schedule II controlled substances
are not subject to any of the controls or safeguards to which lawful users are
subject. Illegal users do not obtain the drug from a licensed· and qualified
physician· based on a medically qualified assessment of need; they are not
informed of the proper and safe use of the drug; they are not made aware of

-23-

drugiDteractions; they are not li:1Uited in when or how often they can obtain
the drug; and their use is not tracked to prevent abuse. And of equal or
grea~er concern, _many unlawful users use the drug not fo~ its therapeutic
effect, but for recreational purposes. See Fact Sheets, at 1 ("Recreationally,
methamphetamine is also abused ... for its intense euphoric effect.").
Additionally, unlike lawful users-who obtain schedule II contr9lled
.

substances from closely regulated pharmaceutical manufacturers-illegal
users frequently obtain the product from street manufacturers who are not
subject to any control. R453:37-38; accord Fact Sheets, at 1. For example,
methamphetamine obtained on the street is generally "manufactured in
makeshift laboratories that frequently could have all kinds of contaminating
substances in them." R453:38. As a result, the potency of the drug may vary
from drug-buy to drug-buy, making it difficult for the user to anticipate
how any given dose will affect him before he gets behind the wheel of a car~
Moreover, much of the methamphetamine that is ingested orally-as
is generally true for lawful use - is "lost either in the gut or ... metabolized
in the liver," and the effects of the methamphetamine thus take longer.
R453:51; see Fact Sheets, at 1. On the other hand, unlawful users "often begin
with intranasal or oral use and progress to intravenous use, and occasional-

ly smoking." Fact Sheets, at 1. The effect of methamphetamine that is intro-
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duced intravenously is much quicker. R453:50-51; accord Fact Sheets, at 3
("Onset of effects is rapid following intravenous use and smoking, while effects onset more slowly following oral use."). In addition, abrupt discontinuation of methamphetamine use "can produce extreme fatigue, mental
depression, apathy, long periods of sleep, irritability, and disorientation."

Id. Such abrupt discontinuation may very well occur in illegal users, but is
not likely to occur by lawful users under the care of a physician.
All of these factors make the effects of illegally using controlled substances more unpredictable than those using them legally. Consequently,
those who use controlled substances manufac~red outside strict regulatory
controls, or outside the supervision of a licensed health care professional,
are nC?t similarly situated to those who obtain and use the drugs under lawful prescription.
In support of his argun1ent that legal and illegal drug users_ are similarly situated, Ainsworth relies on the rationale of State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31,
137 P.3d 726. See Resp.Br£. 30-31. But that case is of no help to him.
In Holm, this Court addressed a federal equal protection challenge to
a statute criminalizing sexual conduct with a minor unless lawfully married
to the minor. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ,198. The Court rejected the proposition that
married and unmarried minors are not similarly situated. Id. at ,I100. The
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Court held that whether individuals are similarly situated is "based on the
cond1.:1ct" of those individuals, not their legal relationship to each other. Id.
The· Court thus held that "individuals who engage in sexual conduct with
partners who are at least ten years their junior and who are sixteen or seventeen years old are 'similarly situated' for purposes of equal protection analysis regardless of the marital relationship between those involved." Id. But
the classification at issue here is not based on a relationship as it was in

Holm. It is based on "conduct" -the manner by which the user secures the
controlled substance and the controls to which he or she is subject.

***
In sum, given the significant and substantial differences between illegal and lawful users, it cannot be said that the two classes of people are similarly situated. Unlawful users frequently use the drug for recreational purposes, and when they do attempt to self-medicate, they have neither the
training nor experience to do so safely, are not subject to the careful controls
in place to prevent abuse, and often obtain drugs from unsafe sources. Because these two groups are not sim.ilarly situated, the inquiry ends and article I, section 24 is not violated. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ,r 35.
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·2. In any event, the Legislature has reasonable objectives
warranting disparate treatment.

But even if lawful and illegal users were similarly situated, the Legislature has reasonable objectives that warrant the disparity in treatment. This
Court has repeatedly held that "the legislature 'has considerable discretion
in the designation of classifications.'" Honie, 2002 UT 4, ,r36 (quoting Malan

v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984)). Accordingly, the classification is
11

presumptively permissible" unless it involves a suspect class, such as race

or gender, or implicates a fundamental right. In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT
51, if68, 358 P.3d 1009. Ainsworth has not claimed that these subclassifications implicate a fundamental right or suspect class that would require heightened scrutiny. See Resp.Br£. 31-32. Accordingly, this Court engages in rational basis review. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ,r21.
When determining whether a rational basis exists for disparate treatment among similarly situated people, this Court engages in a three-part
11

inquiry: (1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and (3) whether there is areasonable relatio~ship between .the classification and the legislative purpose."

State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ,r22, 254 P.3d 183. The DWI statute satisfies
this standard.
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As discussed, when schedule II controlled substances are not used
under the direction of a physician or dispensed by a pharmacy, there are no

@

safeguards in place to help ensure that the substance is being used safely
and for therapeutic purposes only. The prescription-based classification is

C',

~

thus reasonable because the uncontrolled use of schedule II controlled substances has a greater potential for abuse.
The objectives of the classification are also legitimate. Here, the Legislature "determined, or could have reasonably determined," that compared
to lawfully-prescribed schedule II controlled substances, the uncontrolled
use of drugs has "more potential for abuse" and is "less likely to be used
safely in treatment for medical purposes." Robinson, 2011 UT 30, if24 (discussing classification based on kind of drug). Also, the Legislature determined, or could have reasonably determined, that uncontrolled use of drugs
is more likely for recreational purposes, which, as observed by Ainsworth's
expert.below, creates a greater risk of impairing a person's ability to safely
drive. R453:63. Given the increased risk for abuse by uncontrolled drug use,
the Legislature has reasonably concluded that the harm presented by lawful
~sers is less than that presented by illegal users. The deterrent value alone
justifies the harsher penalty.
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Finally, a reasonable relationship exists between the classification and
the legislative purposes. As this Court held in Robinson, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in preventing individuals from using or being under the
influence of controlled substances in Utah." Id. at 125. It has an even greater
interest in preventing drivers from using controlled substances without a
lawful prescription due to the increased risk of abuse. The Legislature has
thus concluded that the risk of harm on the roads presented by uncontrolled
use of drugs is less than that presented by the controlled use of drugs. The
increased penalties for unlawful use by negligent drivers reflects these relative harms. Consequently, "a reasonable relationship exists between the
criminal classifications and the legislative objectives." Id.
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BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT

II.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion to impose
consecutive prison terms.
As cross-petitioner, Ainsworth argues that once the court of appeals
held that he should be resentenced to reflect convictions for a third degree
felony rather than a second degree felony, the trial court erred in addressing
his appellate claim that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that
the prison sentences for his three DWI convictions run consecutively, rather
than concurrently. Resp.Br£. 37-39. In the alternative, he argues that the
court of appeals erred in affirming his consecutive sentences. Resp.Br£. 3943. Both arguments lack merit.
A. Whether the court of appeals should have addressed the trial
court's impos.ition of consecutive sentences is not an issue for
which the cross-petition was granted; in any event, the court
of appeals was right to consider the question.

Ainsworth contends that where the court of appeals "remand[ed]
with instructions for the district court to enter his convictions as thirddegree felonies· and to resentence him accordingly," Ainsworth, 2016 UT
App 2, ,I22, the appellate court had "no need to address" his challenge to
consecutive sentences because resentencing would require the trial court to
consider his behavior since his imprisonment on the original sentence - his
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"progress toward rehabilitation, conduct -in prison, and success in programming during the time of his appeal." Resp.Br£. 38-39. This Court, however~ did not grant review on that question, limiting its review on the crosspetition to "[w]hether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding the district
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences." Order
granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Cross-Petition in part, dated July
20, 2016. This Court should thus not address it.
In any event, the court of appeals was right to address Ainsworth' s
challenge to consecutive sentences.
Ainsworth's argument fails at the outset because resentencing in this
case was not necessitated by the discretionary aspects of the sentence based
on relevant factual considerations. It was necessitated by the court of appeals' purely legal conclusion that entry of his convictions as second degree
felonies violated the Utah Constitution's uniform-operation-of-laws provisi~n .. See Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, if 18 ("vacat[ing' Ainsworth' s [second. degree-felony] convictions and remand[ing] for the district court to re-enter
them as third-degree felonies"). Under this circumstance, resentencing does
not require a reconsideration of the relevant sentencing facts, but the mere
ministerial application of the statutory prison term for a third degree felo-
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ny-an ind~terminate prison term of zero to five years. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203_(3) (West 2015).

Even if, on resentencing, the trial court were at liberty to consider
new facts that arose since his original imprisonment-his "progress toward
rehabilitation, conduct in prison, and success in programming during the
time of his appeal," Resp.Br£. 39- the propriety of consecutive sentences is
likely to arise on remand. Citing rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ainsworth contends that the authority of the Court to address matters likely to arise on reman_d are limited to "' questions of law'" in "' a new
trial.'" Resp.Br£. 38 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 30(a)). But that rule does not
preclude the Court from addressing other issues that are likely to arise on
remand for resentencing, and the cases Ainsworth cites do no so suggest.
In State v. James, this Court addressed its authority to address issues
not necessary to a determination of the appeal in much broader terms: "Issues that are fully briefed on appeal and are likely to be presented on· remand

should be addressed by this court." 819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991) (emphasis
added); accord State v. _Lowe, 20~8 UT 58, ,r61, 19~ P.3d 867 (quoting James).
The Court has later explained that it addresses such issues "to assist the trial
court" on remand. Wilson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 2012 UT 43, if 79, 289 P.3d
_369. The practice is also a matter of judicial economy. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d
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750, 755 (Utah 1986) (holding that "in the interest of judicial economy it is
appropriate for us to comment on [defendant's] other contentions_ on appeal
that will arise again upon retrial"). Indeed, it makes little sense not to address an issue on appeal that will most assuredly arise on remand and then
be appealed again afterwards. Such is the case here.
Where the trial court imposed consecutive one-to-fifteen-year prison
terms for Ainsworth' s DWI convictions, there is no reason to believe that it
would now impose concurrent zero-to-five-year terms. Ainsworth contends
that later developments regarding his rehabilitation, conduct in prison, and
programming during appeal may change the calculus. Resp.Br£. 39. But _
Ainsworth has pointed to nothing in the record suggesting that those new, .
and unknown, developments would operate in his favor. And even if they
did, it is unlikely that it would be enough to change the sentence where
Ainsworth has .once before graduated from a drug treatment
program.
Correctional Addiction Treatment Services (CATS)- only to reoffend.
R455:10-14. 3

3

More.over, the fact that this Court addresses an issue likely to arise
again on remand does" 'not ... suggest that the trial court is precluded from
making different findings of -fact or conclusions of law during remand.'"
Wilson, 2012 UT 43, 179 (quoting Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,
,I24, 176 P.3d 476).

-33-

@,

B.

The court of _appeals correctly held that th·e trial court properly exercised its discretion. ~o order consecutive sentences.

Ainsworth argues that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's imposition of consecutive sentences. Resp. Br£. 39-43. He contends
that the imposition of consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion because "the trial court failed to adequately consider Ainsworth's history, char.

.. ·

•

acter, an~ rehabilitative needs." Resp.Br£. 41 (emphasis added). Specifically,
he contends that the trial court "failed to adequately consider that [his] offenses' arose out of one criminal episode"'; that it "failed to adequately consider the single criminal episode arose from negligent behavior"; and that it
"failed to give adequate consideration to [his] prospects for rehabilitation."
R_esp.Brf. 41-43 (emphases adde9-). These claims lack merit, amounting to no
more than a request that the C~urt substitute Ainsworth's self-serving assessment
of his character and prospects for rehabilitation. for the trial court's
.
· judgment.
Subject to the limits presc!ibed by law, sentencing "rests entirely
within the discretion of the [trial] court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.4-d 1210,
1219 (Utah 1984). Where a defendant has been found guilty_of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent or conse~utive seiltences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (West 2004). And the court may impose
. consecutive sentences for multiple crhnes even if the offenses were commit-
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ted in the course of a single crin1inal episode. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401(5).
In determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court
must "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2).
"[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court" and this Court will not overturn a sentencing
decision unless it is clear that the court abused its discretion. See State v. Ger-

rard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). "To do otherwise would have a chilling
effect on the trial court which has the main responsibility for se~tencing."

Id. This Court will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court "fails to
consider all legally relevant factors, ... if the sentence imposed ~xceeds the
limits prescribed by law," or if the sentence is otherwise" 'inherently unfair
or clearly.excessive."' State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ,I66, 52 P.3d 1210 (quoting

State
v. Helms,
2002 UT 12, ,I14, 40 P.3d 626).
.
.
In this case, the district.court expressly stated that it had "considered
the nature, circumstances and. gravity of the offense[s],'~ including the fact
that there were "multiple victims," and that it had also "carefully considered [Ainsworth's] history and
rehabilitative needs." R455:32. This is all that
.
.
is required by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). And Ainsworth has

-35-

not argued that the district court did not consider these factors. See Resp.Br£.
39-43. Nor· has Ainsworth argued that the consecutive sentences were not

('.'.:\

~:

authorized by law. Id. Accordingly, this Court may only reverse if ~he dis.

.

trict court's imposition of consecutive sentences was " 'inherently unfair or
clearly excessive.'" Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 166 (citation omitted). This Court will
· find a sentence inherently unfair -''only if it can be said that no reasonable
man would take the view adopted _by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at
887. That cannot be said here.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the tragic and costly toll visited upon the Pack family and Defendant's long _crimi-

nal history-which included at least four DUI convictions and multiple
drug convictions - far outweighed any mitigating factors and justified consecutive sentences. R409-11. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in
concluding that Defendant's reformed attitude was too lit~le and far too late.
As the prosecutor ~xplained at sentencing, Defendant had had "prior reha. (i;;

bilitative efforts" - "opportunity after opportunity" - but "all failed."
R455:9-10. He missed urine tests, refused to participate in residential treatment even though he had bee~ accepted, later graduated from the CATS
program, only then to test positive for illegal drugs and have his probation
revoked. R455:10-14.
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Defenda11:t now faces an indeterminate prison term of three-to-thirty
years. See Utah Code Ann. §_ 76-3-401(8)(a) (limiting maximum sentence to
30 years). This ~ange is roughly consistent with the criminal history assessment. See R401. Simply put, given the gravity of the offenses and Defendant's long history of abuse, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
~-

Ainsworth contends that the district court did not adequately consider that the offenses arose out of a single criminal episode and that the injuries caused "arose from negligent behavior." Resp.Br£. 49. Of course, those
facts do not bar the imposition of consecutive sentences. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-401(5) (West 2004) (stating that "court may impose consecutive
sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode"). And it cannot be credibly argued that t~e court was unaware or did not consider that
all of the crimes arose out of the same incident and the injuries resulted
from negligent driving-thos~ facts were made known to the judge in the
plea colloquy, R454:1_1-12, the plea affidavit, R341, and the presentence investigation report (PSI), R396-97. Moreover, Ainsworth's crimes were not
entirely a ~egligent act. His neglig~nt driving was the result of a deliberate
act-intentionally using methamphetamine and driving thereafter.
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Ainsworth contends that the court did not adequately consider his
"prospects for rehabilitation." Resp.Br£. 42. He acknowledges his poor track
record at rehabilitation for previous drug use. Resp.Br£. 42 (conceding that
he "may have had trouble with rehabilitation in the past"). But he contends,
in essence, that the district court should have ignored those past failures
and credit instead his "change of heart" following the accident and his· expression of remorse at sentencing. Resp.Br£. 42. But "[r]emorse expressed
only at sentencing is highly suspect." State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 1103, 20
P.3d 342. Indeed, at the beginning of the criminal case, Ainsworth asserted
"that he didn't have any idea where [the methamphetamine in his system]
came from." R455:6. He sent a letter to the P.ack family saying, "Oh, no, I
didn't do this. I didn't use meth. I don't know what this is from." R455:6.
Later, as the process continued, he admitted using meth two days before,
claiming that only . methamphetamine metabolites wer~ in his system.
R455:6. But that was not the case. The toxicology _report demonstrated that
the methamphetamine found in his blood was the active drug. R455:6. And
only after he pled guilty did A~sworth admit that he had been using meth.

'

:.

'

amphetamine "every day for four days." R455:9. In short, the closer Ainsworth' s day of reckoning came, the more contrite he became.
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Ainsworth also points to his progress at rehabilitation while awaiting
trial in jail, observing that he remained sober, took AA classes, expressed a
willingness to enter Odyssey House upon release, and asserted a desire to
become a substance abuse counselor. Resp.Br£. 42 (citing R455:379,392). But
sobriety in jail is not voluntary. And Ainsworth had attended AA and completed drug rehabilitation programs in the past, yet later reoffended.
II

II

R455:13. As most judges would agree," a defendant tends to express remorse and intentions of conversion right about the time the judge is considering the defendant's sentenc_e." State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 940 (Utah 1998)
(Russon,

J.,

dissenting). Again, as his day of reckoning approached-one

that presented consequences f~r greater than he had faced in the pastAinsworth's acts of contrition and conversion, not surprisingly, increased.
The judge could thus reasonably conclude that Ainsworth' s expressions of
remorse and willingness to change was more about ~vading pun~shment
than a desire to change. Indeed, . "even if a defendant's desire to reform
should be given weight during sentencing, the sentencing judge-not this·
court~is ~est equipped to evaluate the defendant's credibility and sincerity
in this regard." Id. (Russon,

J., dissenting); accord State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68,

,127, 322 P.3d 624 (holding that the Court "will not second-guess the [sen-
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tencingJ court, which is 'in the best position to en~ure that justice is done")
(quoting State v. Moreno, 2005 UT
App
200, if 9, 113 P.3d 992) .
.
.·
,.,

In sum, Ainsworth now claims-after causing the death of an 18month old baby and seriously injuring the child's parents - that the trial
court failed to adequately consider his remorse, his "change of heart and
progress toward rehabilitation" since committing the crime, and how his
"emotional health, strong family connections, and employment would facilitate his rehabilitation." Resp.Br£. 42-43. But the impact of these claims pales
in c01nparison to the personal and devastating consequences of his crime,
his long· criminal history, and his failure to rehabilitate despite past opportunities to do so. Accordingly, it cannot be said "that no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court."_ Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
This Court should therefore affirm the court of appeals' holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive se!ltences.

CONCLUSION
For the fore~oing reaso~~ and those stated in the State's opening
brief, this Cou~t should revers~ the court of appeals' holding that the DWI
~nh'1;nce!Ilent provision violate.~. the constitution, and it should _affirm the
court of appeals' q.ecision upholding the consecutive sentences.
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